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INTRODUCTION 
At first glance, the immigration system and the domestic child welfare 
system may appear to be worlds apart, but in fact they have much in common 
and often overlap. This Comment offers a targeted look at a particular process 
within the U.S. immigration system, Special Immigrant Juvenile Status 
(SIJS), and how it intersects with and parallels the domestic foster care 
system. Both SIJS and foster care struggle to meet the competing goals of 
 
† J.D. Candidate, University of Pennsylvania Law School, 2020. Thank you to all the 
practitioners who generously shared their time and experience during my research, as well as to 
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preserving and reuniting families on the one hand and punishing 
“undesirable” families on the other. The tendency of these systems to see 
families in terms of innocent children against “bad” parents, and the ability 
of our society to tolerate systems that punish parents in this way, is part of a 
long history of discrimination in this country, particularly against poor 
families of color. This comparison between SIJS and the domestic foster care 
system will highlight some of the underlying assumptions that make both 
processes so harsh for the families involved and discuss how the apparent 
tensions between the two systems are actually rooted in the same harmful 
normative ideas. 
Part I provides an overview and history of both SIJS and foster care and 
explains how SIJS functions within the broader immigration and child 
welfare systems. 
Part II takes a more in-depth look at some important parallels between SIJS 
and two sub-areas of the foster care system: voluntary placement of youth in 
foster care by their parents and kinship care. SIJS shares certain problematic 
ideas and structures with both voluntary placement and kinship care. 
In voluntary placement agreements and SIJS, parents and children alike 
are forced by a lack of other alternatives into systems designed to be punitive 
and to keep families apart. In voluntary placements, parents often have no 
other viable options for receiving needed support—particularly for children 
with severe emotional and behavioral problems—besides the child welfare 
system; these parents then become trapped in a system that assigns them the 
blame for being bad parents rather than one that acknowledges society’s role 
in creating the family’s desperate circumstances. Youth seeking SIJS status 
often do so because it is the only pathway toward legal status in the U.S. they 
qualify for, and many do so through one-parent SIJS, in which a non-abusive 
parent retains custody of the youth. However, the benefit of SIJS status 
comes with strings attached, which end up needlessly separating families. 
Principally, SIJS recipients are prohibited from ever sponsoring their 
parent—even the non-abusive parent—for legal status. The lack of other 
necessary supports (both socioeconomic and migratory) forces families into 
these systems, yet as a society we have failed to acknowledge or take 
responsibility for this lack of alternatives for achieving needed support and 
stability. Additionally, parents are blamed for their involvement in those 
systems, furthering the oversimplified narrative that these systems protect 
innocent children from “bad” parents. This rigid “innocent child/bad parent” 
framework serves to mask the structural inequalities and discrimination that 
those “bad” parents face that force them into processes like SIJS and foster 
care. And by casting children as passive victims, it drowns out the voices and 
agency of youth themselves. 
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Likewise, the parallels between SIJS and kinship care demonstrate the 
way both systems fail to respect the autonomy of these marginalized families, 
particularly those with nontraditional structures that arise as a result of 
systemic problems such as poverty, the carceral state, and the broken 
immigration system. Instead of supporting extended, multicultural, and 
multinational families, both kinship care and SIJS view them with suspicion 
and subject them to invasive state surveillance as a precondition of the 
support they seek. SIJS imposes an adversarial model of custody on families 
and relationships that, prior to state involvement, might not have been 
adversarial at all, and places undocumented sponsors at direct risk for 
supporting children. Similarly, kinship care requires that extended family 
members comply with the intrusive supervision requirements of foster care. 
This phenomenon in both systems is also a direct result of societal narratives 
that view those adults and families as undeserving and untrustworthy. 
Part III describes how the common normative ideas underlying both SIJS 
and foster care give rise to tensions when the two systems intersect in state 
dependency courts. While child welfare law, at least in principle, strives for 
reunification as a primary goal, SIJS youth have no such protection, as 
reunification is explicitly prohibited if they are to receive immigration status 
through SIJS. While dependency law is supposed to leave the door to 
reunification open as long as it is in a child’s best interests, SIJS applicants 
ask courts for an immediate and permanent determination. While the foster 
care system, at least in theory, is not supposed to equate poverty with neglect, 
SIJS-eligible youth must often make the exact opposite argument. In essence, 
the few protections the child welfare system has for families are by design not 
applicable to immigrant youth, making the adjudication of SIJS in state 
juvenile court an uncomfortable fit at best. 
Finally, Part IV concludes by proposing changes to the SIJS statute as 
currently written based on this comparative approach. While foster care is far 
from perfect, it contains important lessons about the importance of 
reunification and reliance on extended family networks that can and should 
be applied to SIJS. Such policy changes may not happen in the near future, 
but I include some considerations for advocates in both systems that may help 
to change the conversation. 
As a threshold matter, there are certainly situations in which youth 
seeking SIJS and foster care protections have suffered terrible abuses; this 
Comment does not argue otherwise or address those cases. Rather, this 
Comment looks systemically at how families are underserved and 
undermined by the rigid viewpoints reflected in U.S. child welfare and 
immigration laws, highlights problems in each through a comparative 
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approach, and shows how discriminatory narratives in our society give rise 
to and reinforce those problems. 
I. HISTORY AND BACKGROUND ON FOSTER CARE AND SIJS 
The histories of SIJS and foster care are intertwined. SIJS was initially 
created in response to the needs of undocumented youth in the state foster 
care system.1 Both have gone through substantial legislative changes 
throughout their histories that have been framed by rhetoric of protecting 
innocent children while painting their families as undeserving or even evil.2 
While the history of foster care is much longer than that of SIJS, the creation 
and evolution of SIJS featured the same arguments and rhetoric. 
Understanding this common history is necessary to fully understand the 
current processes in place in SIJS and foster care and how they affect both 
the families and children they serve. 
A. Foster Care 
The history of the child welfare system in the U.S. has been characterized 
as a pendulum that “swings from expressing the predominant objective of 
keeping . . . families together to making protection of children from parental 
harm its top priority.”3 The foster care system has its roots in the mid-
nineteenth century, when the Children’s Aid Society of New York sent 
thousands of children, often the children of poor immigrants, west on orphan 
trains to new homes.4 While child welfare law is principally a state law issue, 
the federal government began to pass legislation relevant to foster care 
beginning with the Social Security Act of 1935, which provided the first 
federal funds for services to abused and neglected children.5 In 1980, the 
Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act required “reasonable efforts” by 
state agencies to help children remain at home.6 That same law was amended 
in 1997 with the Adoption and Safe Families Act (ASFA), which encouraged 
 
1 Elizabeth Keyes, Evolving Contours of Immigration Federalism: The Case of Migrant Children, 19 
HARV. LATINO L. REV. 33, 45-46 (2016). 
2 See, e.g., infra notes 3, 4, 44. 
3 DOROTHY ROBERTS, SHATTERED BONDS: THE COLOR OF CHILD WELFARE 104 (2002). 
4 Jeanne F. Cook, A History of Placing-Out: The Orphan Trains, 74 CHILD WELFARE 181, 181 
(1995). The framing of the orphan train children as innocent and “deserving” victims of bad parents 
was present even in this era. See id. at 186 (“Impoverished parents of these same children were 
generally presented in the press as unsympathetic characters who constituted ‘a class from which 
spring mainly the great tides of wretchedness and crime.’”). 
5 Sharon F. Bass, The Public Foster Care System and the Transracial Placement of African-American 
Children: Exploring the History and the Issue, 4 U. PA. J. L. & SOC. CHANGE 73, 78 (1997). 
6 Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-272, § 471(a)(15), 94 Stat. 
500, 503 (1980) (amended 1997); ROBERTS, supra note 3, at 105. 
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quick termination of parental rights and adoption as a remedy for the 
inarguable harms that extended time in substitute care can inflict on 
children.7 The predictable result of those changes was that state child welfare 
agencies became less focused on reunification and more concerned with 
adoption or concurrent planning, causing often insurmountable obstacles for 
parents who have mental health or addiction problems, are living in poverty, 
or are incarcerated.8 
This historical shift away from reunification and toward adoption makes 
sense when viewed alongside the shift in public discourse during that same 
time period; poor families were increasingly disparaged for receiving welfare 
benefits, in particular single Black mothers.9 ASFA was passed immediately 
following the 1996 welfare reforms that dramatically reduced available aid to 
the same poor families most at risk of involvement in the child welfare system.10 
As a result, the same families that were required under ASFA to more quickly 
show that they could provide for their children in order to achieve reunification 
were stripped of the safety net with which to do so.11 This contradiction is a 
reflection of how “Americans’ compassion toward poor children has always 
existed in tension with the impulse to blame their parents.”12 
Currently, there are over 440,000 youth in foster care nationwide, the vast 
majority of whom are placed in care for reasons relating to neglect.13 Only 
sixteen percent of new entries into foster care in Fiscal Year 2017 cited 
physical or sexual abuse as a reason for removal, while “neglect” was cited as 
a reason for removal in sixty-two percent of cases.14 The statutory definition 
of neglect varies by state,15 and the vague definition of this term leads to over-
 
7 Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-89, § 103(a), 111 Stat. 2115, 2117-18 
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 675(5)(e)); ROBERTS, supra note 3, at 105-06. 
8 See “You Have to Get it Together”: ASFA’s Impact on Parents and Families (Nora McCarthy & 
Lynne Miller eds.), in URBAN INST., CTR. FOR STUDY OF SOCIAL POLICY, INTENTIONS AND 
RESULTS: A LOOK BACK AT THE ADOPTION AND SAFE FAMILIES ACT, 36, 37 (2009), 
https://www.urban.org/research/publication/intentions-and-results-look-back-adoption-and-safe-
families-act/view/full_report [https://perma.cc/CZ7F-KDQK] (noting that “ASFA is most unfair to 
parents who are unable to reunify with their children because of factors beyond their control—prison 
sentences or drug treatment programs longer than 15 months, court delays, or mental illnesses that 
may prevent parents from ever having sole custody”). 
9 ROBERTS, supra note 3, at 173. 
10 See generally Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub. 
L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105; ROBERTS, supra note 3, at 173. 
11 ROBERTS, supra note 3, at 173-74. 
12 Id. at 173. 
13 U.S. DEP’T.  OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., ADMIN. FOR CHILDREN & FAMILIES, THE 
AFCARS REPORT: PRELIMINARY FY 2017 ESTIMATES 1 (2017) [hereinafter AFCARS REPORT], 
https://www.acf.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/cb/afcarsreport25.pdf [https://perma.cc/27TK-YAPZ]. 
14 Id. at 2. 
15 While many states do try to differentiate between poverty and neglect in their child welfare 
laws, it is a difficult line to draw and states frequently include circumstances related to poverty when 
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reporting and a discretionary role for child protective service workers 
investigating those reports.16 Although there are constitutional limitations on 
the states’ ability to remove children from the home in circumstances relating 
solely to poverty, such broad definitions of neglect predictably put poor 
children at increased risk of entering the system.17 This in turn 
disproportionately affects families of color.18 The racial disparities of youth in 
foster care—although better than they once were—are still striking: for 
example, in 2017, non-Hispanic Black children made up only fourteen percent 
of the total population, but twenty-three percent of children in foster care.19 
Often, a child is removed from their home and placed in foster care as a 
result of a tip to a state child protective service.20 Such tips may come from 
community members or mandated reporters, who have a statutory duty to 
report such suspicions.21 Case workers then visit the family and make a 
 
defining neglect. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 8-201(25) (2019) (defining neglect as “[t]he inability 
or unwillingness of a parent, guardian or custodian of a child to provide that child with supervision, 
food, clothing, shelter or medical care if that inability or unwillingness causes unreasonable risk of 
harm to the child’s health or welfare,” and only providing an exception for lack of available services 
in meeting “the needs of a child with a disability or chronic illness.”); N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT 
§ 1012(f)(i)(A) (2019) (attempting to exclude poverty by defining “neglected child” as one whose 
parent has failed to “supply[] the child with adequate food, clothing, shelter or education . . . though 
financially able to do so or offered financial or other reasonable means to do so”); 23 PA. CONS. 
STAT. § 6303(a)-(b)(1)(7) (2019) (defining “serious physical neglect” in part as “[t]he failure to 
provide a child with adequate essentials of life, including food, shelter or medical care” with no 
explicit exception for inability to do so). 
16 See Robert Lukens, The Impact of Mandatory Reporting Requirements on the Child Welfare System, 
5 RUTGERS J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 177, 201, 222 (2007) (arguing that over-reporting to child protective 
services occurs in part because of “vague or over inclusive” definitions of neglect, and child protective 
workers must make discretionary determinations about whether to proceed with an investigation). 
17 Daan Braveman & Sarah Ramsey, When Welfare Ends: Removing Children from the Home for 
Poverty Alone, 70 TEMP. L. REV. 447, 462-64 (1997). 
18 In 2017, about 8.5% of people in the U.S. reporting as “White, not Hispanic” lived below 
100% of the Federal Poverty Line, as compared to 21.7% of Black individuals, 18.3% of Hispanic 
individuals, and 9.7% of Asian individuals. CURRENT POPULATION SURVEY, U.S. CENSUS 
BUREAU, POV-1: AGE AND SEX OF ALL PEOPLE, FAMILY MEMBERS AND UNRELATED 
INDIVIDUALS ITERATED BY INCOME-TO-POVERTY RATIO AND RACE (2017), 
https://www.census.gov/data/tables/time-series/demo/income-poverty/cps-pov/pov-01.html 
[https://perma.cc/6VKH-4DWV]. 
19 Foster Care, CHILD TRENDS DATABANK (May 24, 2018), https://www.childtrends
.org/?indicators=foster-care [https://perma.cc/JZ65-5FYZ]. 
20 Melissa Jonson-Reid et. al., What Do We Really Know About Usual Care Child Protective 
Services?, 82 CHILD. & YOUTH SERVS. REV. 222, 222 (2017). 
21 Id.; see also Lukens, supra note 16, at 201 (describing how a Child Protective Services 
investigation begins). Starting at the referral stage, poor youth of color are more likely to come 
into contact with the state agency, perhaps because callers have “culturally specific ideas about what 
a good parent looks like.” VIRGINIA EUBANKS, AUTOMATING INEQUALITY: HOW HIGH-TECH 
TOOLS PROFILE, POLICE, AND PUNISH THE POOR 146, 153-54 (2018). In many states, callers may 
choose to remain anonymous, making it more difficult to determine their motivations for calling. 
Id. at 155. 
2020] "Best" Interests and "Bad" Parents 519 
discretionary determination about whether to remove the child from the 
home or provide other services.22 Of the youth exiting the foster care system 
in Fiscal Year 2017, children nationwide usually spent 19.2 months on average 
in out-of-home care.23 Of those children, 49% were reunified with a parent 
or former caregiver; of the rest, most either aged out of the system (8%), were 
adopted (24%), or were placed in the guardianship of a relative or individual 
that was not their former caregiver (7%).24 African-American children are more 
likely to enter care, are less likely to be adopted, and have worse outcomes after 
leaving care in terms of housing, employment, and educational stability.25 
In a subset of cases particularly relevant to comparing SIJS and foster 
care, parents themselves either relinquish their children to the state agency 
when investigated, or independently contact the agency asking for help 
because they are in crisis. When caregivers reach an agreement with the child 
welfare agencies about placing the child in foster care, it is called a voluntary 
placement, and the procedures and standards for this process vary widely 
among states.26 When families who are being investigated agree to voluntarily 
place their children, it is difficult to separate out the need for support from 
fear of even worse consequences such as having abuse and neglect charges 
filed against them if they fail to cooperate, but both may be part of the 
decision.27 Parents that contact protective services directly are often in a 
situation in which their child has severe behavioral or mental health problems 
that the family does not have the means to address.28 
While exact data is not easily available, one study relying on data from 
the Adoption and Foster Care Analysis Reporting System (AFCARS) found 
that in 2013, about 3.4% of removals from the home were through voluntary 
placements.29 While those children were demographically similar to those 
placed by court order in terms of race and gender, youth with a disability 
 
22 Jonson-Reid, supra note 20, at 226. 
23 AFCARS REPORT, supra note 13, at 3. 
24 Id. 
25 See FOSTERING YOUTH TRANSITIONS, THE ANNIE E. CASEY FOUNDATION 2-3 (2018), 
https://www.aecf.org/m/resourcedoc/aecf-fosteringyouthtransitions-2018.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/88DS-W5WM] (offering data on how Black youth are three times as likely to be 
in foster care as white youth, 10% more likely to be emancipated from foster care, and have especially 
poor outcomes for education and employment). 
26 Annette Semanchin Jones et al., Voluntary Placements in Child Welfare: A Comparative Analysis 
of State Statutes, 88 CHILD. YOUTH SERV. REV. 387, 387-88 (2018). 
27 Somini Sengupta, Despondent Parents See Foster Care as Only Option, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 1, 
2000), https://www.nytimes.com/2000/09/01/nyregion/despondent-parents-see-foster-care-as-only-
option.html [https://perma.cc/9EMJ-MCFE] (“Sometimes, child welfare officials offer voluntary 
placement as an alternative to filing abuse or neglect charges against the parents.”). 
28 Katherine Hill, Prevalence, Experiences, and Characteristics of Children and Youth Who Enter 
Foster Care Through Voluntary Placement Agreements, 74 CHILD. YOUTH SERV. REV. 62, 63 (2017). 
29 Id. at 65. 
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diagnosis were far more likely to have been placed in foster care voluntarily, 
with 41% of the voluntary placements involving children with a disability 
diagnosis.30 Outcomes for those youth were worse overall, with the study 
indicating that they “spend more time in a higher number of placement 
settings than children who enter foster care through a court order.”31 
In another subset of cases explored in this Comment, one of the most 
promising changes to the foster care system has been the increase in kinship 
care, an arrangement in which children are placed with members of their own 
extended family rather than traditional foster care placements or group 
homes.32 In 2017, about 32% of youth in foster care resided with a relative.33 
Children removed from their homes fare far better in kinship care than in 
foster care with strangers by every metric and it has been lauded as the best 
solution for the notoriously problematic foster care system.34 Youth are “more 
likely to maintain contact with their parents[,]” stay in a single placement, 
and maintain cultural and community connections.35 These benefits are 
unsurprising, as kinship care mirrors the historic model of community and 
extended family support that has been a source of resilience, particularly for 
poor Black families, since the beginning of the nation’s history.36 
However, kinship care has its own set of problems for families. Kinship 
care providers in many states receive lower levels of economic support despite 
the fact that kinship care providers are usually more economically 
disadvantaged than non-relative foster parents.37 Additionally, rather than 
respecting the autonomy of kinship relationships while supporting them 
 
30 Id. at 66 tbl.1. 
31 Id. at 67. 
32 Leonard Edwards, Relative Placement: The Best Answer for our Foster Care System, 69 
JUVENILE & FAMILY CT. J. 55, 57-59 (2018). While relative placement is currently the preferred 
federal policy following the Fostering Connections to Success and Increasing Adoptions Act of 2008, 
the reluctance of federal policy to embrace kinship care is also related to the distrust policymakers 
have of those relatives, or as Judge Leonard puts it, “because of the old adage that ‘an apple does not 
fall far from the tree.’” Id. at 57. 
33 AFCARS REPORT, supra note 13. 
34 Children in relative, or kinship, care are more likely to maintain sibling and family 
connections, have fewer disruptive placements, maintain cultural and community identity, and 
experience less stigma and trauma. Edwards, supra note 32, at 58; see also Meredith L. Alexander, 
Note, Harming Vulnerable Children: The Injustice of California’s Kinship Foster Care Policy, 7 HASTINGS 
RACE & POVERTY L.J. 381, 393-96 (2010) (describing the emotional and trauma-mitigating benefits 
of kinship placement, including that “[c]hildren in kinship foster care tend to feel a sense of 
belonging, warmth, history and value to others”). 
35 Dorothy Roberts, Kinship Care and the Price of State Support for Children, 76 CHI.-KENT L. 
REV. 1619, 1625 (2001). 
36 See Bass, supra note 5, at 76 (tracing the history of quasi-kinship networks and extended 
family support to slavery). 
37 See Alexander, supra note 34, at 385-87, 396-97, 410-13 (describing the unique challenges 
facing kinship care providers and why many do not qualify for federal foster care funding). 
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economically, the formal kinship care system subjects families seeking 
support to surveillance and potentially adverse consequences.38 Kinship 
foster parents must pass background tests, meet licensing requirements, and 
comply with regular observation from caseworkers.39 Some families may 
forego any state support at all to avoid this oversight.40 On the other hand, 
youth in a kinship placement tend to reunify more slowly with their parents 
than youth in non-relative care than they would otherwise,41 perhaps due to 
the need for the economic support that comes with kinship care,42 thereby 
extending the length of time the family is subjected to state oversight as a 
price of that support. 
In sum, involvement with the foster care system, whether through 
voluntary placements or kinship care, disproportionately affects poor families 
of color and brings them under the control of a system that mistrusts and 
monitors them in the name of protecting those children. 
B. Special Immigrant Juvenile Status (SIJS) 
Much like foster care, the history of SIJS legislation reveals the tension 
between helping sympathetic youth and placing restrictions on families 
considered undeserving of protection and government support. SIJS was 
created in 1990 for undocumented youth in the foster care system, and 
initially, only youth that were adjudicated dependent by a juvenile court 
qualified.43 The original goal of the statute was to provide a permanent 
solution for those youth that would age out of foster care only to face 
deportation or unstable undocumented status.44 The first version of the 
statute covered youth that had been declared dependent by a state juvenile 
 
38 Roberts, supra note 35, at 1632. 
39 Id. at 1627 (“The agency inspects relatives’ homes, including sleeping arrangements, the 
number of bedrooms, and square footage, and investigates relatives’ backgrounds . . . .”). 
40 Salendria Mabrey, The Cost of Kinship Care: Caring for Relatives Limits Budgets of the Elderly, 
FOSTER CARE NEWSL. (Sept. 1, 2015), http://foster-care-newsletter.com/the-cost-of-kinship-
care/#.XJ94Z5hKjIU [https://perma.cc/SRR5-9X4A] (“Some kinship providers . . . just don’t 
want the state involved in any way because of the stigma that comes with the reputation of child 
welfare systems.”). 
41 Marc Winokur, Amy Holton, & Keri E. Batchelder, Kinship Care for the Safety, Permanency, 
and Well-Being of Children Removed from the Home for Maltreatment, 1 COCHRANE DATABASE 
SYSTEMATIC REVS. 2014, at 1, 18. 
42 Valerie O’Brien, The Benefits and Challenges of Kinship Care, 18 CHILD CARE PRAC. 127, 
136-37 (2012). 
43 Keyes, supra note 1, at 46. 
44 Id. at 45-46; see also Shannon Aimée Daugherty, Special Immigrant Juvenile Status, 80 
BROOK. L. REV. 1087, 1092-93 (2015) (providing the legislative history leading up to the original 
enactment of SIJS). 
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court, were eligible for long-term foster care, and for whom it was not in their 
best interest to return to their country of origin.45 
SIJS was altered in 1997 to include the additional requirement that the 
youth be eligible for foster care because of abuse, neglect, or abandonment.46 
This addition was based in part on fears within Congress that SIJS provided 
a loophole through which any child, including international students, could 
receive permanent resident status. As such, Congress sought to restrict access 
to SIJS to a smaller subset of allegedly deserving youth— those that had 
been abused, abandoned, or neglected.47 This restriction occurred 
alongside the draconian changes of the Illegal Immigration Reform and 
Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) of 1996, which expanded the 
number of crimes that made immigrants deportable, dramatically increased 
funding for immigration enforcement, restricted forms of relief, and 
instituted the harsh ten-year bar to reentry for anyone who had 
accumulated a year of unlawful presence.48 
In 2008, the pendulum swung the other way. SIJS was greatly expanded 
in the William Wilberforce Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization 
Act (the Wilberforce Amendments) to (1) include youth for whom 
reunification with one or more parents was not viable due to abuse, 
abandonment, or neglect and (2) remove the requirement that the youth 
establish eligibility for long-term foster care.49 In other words, youth that 
were abused, abandoned, or neglected by only one parent, and were in a safe 
living situation with the other parent or another guardian, became eligible for 
SIJS.50 These provisions greatly increased the number of eligible youth, and 
 
45 Keyes, supra note 1, at 44 tbl.1. 
46 See Angela Lloyd, Regulating Consent: Protecting Undocumented Immigrant Children from their 
(Evil) Step-Uncle Sam, or how to Ameliorate the Impact of the 1997 Amendments to the SIJ Law, 15 B.U. 
PUB. INT. L.J. 237, 244-45 (2006) (describing the legislative history of the 1997 amendments). 
47 See Daughtery, supra note 44, at 1093 (noting congressional fears of widespread abuse of SIJS 
relief); Keyes, supra note 1, at 44 tbl.1 (summarizing changes to SIJS over the years). Those 
amendments also resolved ongoing tensions between the Immigration and Naturalization Service 
(INS) and state courts by giving INS exclusive jurisdiction over youth in its custody. This potentially 
created a motive to not release eligible children and instead expedite their removal in order to 
frustrate their attempts to apply for SIJS. Gregory Zhong Tian Chen, Elian or Alien? The 
Contradictions of Protecting Undocumented Children Under the Special Immigrant Juvenile Statute, 27 
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 597, 613-14 (2000). 
48 See generally Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. 
104-208, 110 Stat. 3009 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 12 (2012)). 
49 8. U.S.C. § 1101(a)(27)(J) (2018); Angie Junck, Special Immigrant Juvenile Status: Relief for 
Neglected, Abused, and Abandoned Undocumented Children, 63 JUV. & FAM. CT. J. 48, 50 (2012) (“Due 
in part to the problematic and limiting language of the 1997 amendments, revisions to the SIJS 
statute were made in 2008 by the [TVPRA].”). 
50 Keyes, supra note 1, at 56. This interpretation was not immediately accepted, and some state 
courts continued to be resistant to one-parent SIJS. See generally Rodrigo Bacus, Defending One-
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since then SIJS applications have steadily increased.51 Now, youth applying 
for SIJS are usually in the custody of a family member or other guardian, 
although they may also be in state or federal foster care.52 
Although this shift allowed SIJS-eligible youth to remain with their 
families, including undocumented guardians, it continued to draw a sharp 
distinction between innocent children and their undocumented family 
members. The beneficiary child was still prohibited from ever sponsoring a 
parent for legal status—even a non-abusive, custodial parent.53 This was not 
an oversight or a drafting error; advocates fought hard for its repeal.54 Rather, 
the only way that the amendments could pass was by limiting them to 
children who elicited public sympathy while safeguarding against any benefits 
for their parents who did not. 
 
Parent SIJS, 42 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 921 (2015) (describing conflicting state court cases on one-
parent SIJS). 
51 Prior to the expansion of SIJS under the TVPRA in 2008, the number of new arrivals for 
“juvenile court dependents” in 2008 was just twenty. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., YEARBOOK OF 
IMMIGRATION STATISTICS, 22 tbl.7 (2008), https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/
publications/Yearbook_Immigration_Statistics_2008.pdf [https://perma.cc/G2ZJ-WKNH]. A 
report documented an increase in the number of I-360 petitions for SIJS filed from 73 in 2005 to 
3,432 in 2013. RUTH ELLEN WASSAM, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., SPECIAL IMMIGRANT 
JUVENILES: IN BRIEF 6, (2014). According to DHS statistics, SIJS applications increased from only 
1,646 in FY 2010 to 21,800 in FY 2018. U.S.C.I.S., DEP’T OF HOMELAND SECURITY, NUMBER OF 
I-360 PETITIONS FOR SPECIAL IMMIGRANT WITH A CLASSIFICATION OF SPECIAL IMMIGRANT 
JUVENILE (SIJ) BY FISCAL YEAR, QUARTER AND CASE STATUS (2018), https://www.uscis.
gov/sites/default/files/USCIS/Resources/Reports%20and%20Studies/Immigration%20Forms%20D
ata/Adjustment%20of%20Status/I360_sij_performancedata_fy2018_qtr4.pdf [https://perma.cc/NJ
9K-67QV]. Despite this dramatic increase in applications filed, Citizenship and Immigration 
Services, the agency within DHS responsible for affirmative applications, has steadily decreased the 
rate at which it processes SIJS applications, with a dramatic drop-off in 2016. Austin Rose, For 
Vulnerable Immigrant Children, A Longstanding Path to Protection Narrows, MIGRATION POLICY INST. 
(July 25, 2018), https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/vulnerable-immigrant-children-longstan
ding-path-protection-narrows [https://perma.cc/7XW9-BAU6]. 
52 See IMMIGRANT LEGAL RESOURCE CENTER, SPECIAL IMMIGRANT JUVENILE STATUS, 
Chapter 3, § 3.2: Introduction And Overview To Special Immigrant Juvenile Status, in Part II: 
Special Immigrant Juvenile Status For Children And Youth Under Juvenile Court Jurisdiction (June 
2018), https://www.ilrc.org/sites/default/files/resources/sijs-5th-2018-ch_03.pdf [https://perma.cc/
77SQ-2ZWG] (describing the different processes for applying for SIJS based on whether a child is 
in the custody of a family member or the state or federal government). 
53 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(27)(J)(iii)(II) (2018) (“No natural parent or prior adoptive parent of any 
alien provided special immigrant status . . . shall thereafter, by virtue of such parentage, be accorded 
any right, privilege, or status under this chapter.”). 
54 In other respects, the legislative history in fact indicates a careful and thoughtful drafting 
process. See Bacus, supra note 50, at 934 (noting that drafts of the legislation indicated a careful 
expansion of SIJS in the phrasing of the provision about foster care); Irene Scharf, Second Class 
Citizenship? The Plight of Naturalized Special Immigrant Juveniles, 40 CARDOZO L. REV. 579, 587 (2018) 
(rejecting the possibility that the failure to enact this change was a last-minute drafting error, 
because the exact language used in the 2008 amendments had already been proposed a year earlier). 
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SIJS remains unique among forms of immigration relief in many ways. It 
applies exclusively to children, in contrast to the majority of U.S. 
immigration law, which is overwhelmingly designed with adult applicants in 
mind.55 For other potential forms of relief, such as asylum, T visas, and U 
visas, youth are adjudicated under the same standards and procedures as 
adults.56 It is the sole place in immigration law where the best interests of a 
child are considered at all.57 SIJS is also the only type of relief in which state 
courts adjudicate the underlying facts before applying to U.S. Citizenship 
and Immigration Services (USCIS).58 These differences between SIJS and 
other forms of immigration relief are linked to its history and development 
in conjunction with state child welfare systems, making it a rich area in which 
to examine the connections between those systems. 
II. PARALLELS BETWEEN SIJS AND CHILD WELFARE 
A comparison between the child welfare system and SIJS reveals that the 
same troubling ideas animate both programs. This section highlights those 
ideas through a targeted comparison of SIJS with two sub-elements of foster 
care: voluntary placements and kinship care. 
 
55 See Maura Ooi, Unaccompanied Should Not Mean Unprotected: The Inadequacies of Relief for 
Unaccompanied Immigrant Minors, 25 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 883, 883-84 (2011) (describing children 
as immigration law’s “biggest void” and explaining the inadequacies of protection for 
unaccompanied minors). 
56 David B. Thronson, Kids Will be Kids? Reconsidering Conceptions of Childrens’ Rights Underlying 
Immigration Law, 63 OHIO ST. L.J. 979, 1001 (2002) (“Adult immigrants have few rights in 
immigration court, and child immigrants fare no better.”). 
57 Lauren Heidbrink, Unintended Consequences: Reverberations of Special Immigrant Juvenile 
Status, 5 APPLIED RES. ON CHILD. 1, 2 (2014) (“SIJ is the only provision in immigration law that 
considers the child’s best interests . . . .”). The 1989 U.N. Convention on the Rights of the Child 
incorporated a special consideration of best interests of a child in refugee and asylum 
determinations, but despite having a major role in drafting the CRC, the United States never ratified 
it. Craig B. Mousin, Rights Disappear When US Policy Engages Children as Weapons of Deterrence, 21 
AMA J. ETHICS 1: E-58-66, 58, 60 (2019). Similarly, the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees 
has proposed child-specific guidelines for asylum claims. Ooi, supra note 55, at 893-94. 
58 Another potential parallel in which state law and state courts determine a necessary 
predicate of eligibility might include marriage licenses for family-based visas; however, those are 
issued routinely without special findings, and USCIS still independently determines the validity of 
a marriage before granting such an application. Likewise, U visas require certification from state 
prosecutors or law enforcement for an applicant to qualify, although again USCIS makes an 
independent determination on the merits of the applicant’s cooperation. Finally, adjudications or 
even arrests within the state criminal justice system provide an increasingly strong predicate for 
exclusion and removability. For more on the connection between state law and immigration, see 
generally CÉSAR CUAUHTÉMOC GARCIA HERNÁNDEZ, CRIMMIGRATION LAW (Am. Bar Ass’n 
2015) (state criminal justice systems and immigration); Michael Kagan, Immigrant Victims, Immigrant 
Accusers, 48 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 915 (2015) (U visas and state law enforcement); David B. 
Thronson, Of Borders and Best Interests: Examining the Experiences of Undocumented Immigrants in U.S. 
Family Courts, 11 TEX. HISP. J.L. & POL’Y 45 (2005) (state family courts and immigration). 
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A comparison between SIJS and voluntary placement illustrates how both 
systems punish and separate families in the name of protecting children 
rather than recognize a larger societal responsibility for the socio-economic 
conditions that put families in such difficult positions in the first place. The 
child welfare system systematically punishes poor families—especially of 
color—rather than provide them with the economic support that they need.59 
Likewise, the immigration system punishes poor immigrant families rather 
than supply meaningful alternatives for migration that would reunite 
families and recognize their value.60 The false choice between innocent 
children and bad parents that is pervasive throughout public narratives 
facilitates this lack of alternatives. 
A comparison between SIJS and kinship care highlights how even when 
foster care and SIJS offer important benefits to youth, those benefits come at 
the price of increased surveillance by the state and decreased family 
autonomy. This comparison also shows how both processes fail to respect the 
fluidity and autonomy of nontraditional family structures in a way that can 
undermine the stability and best interests of children. 
A. SIJS and Voluntary Foster Care Placements: A Comparison 
Individuals and families are often forced into both SIJS and the child 
welfare system because of a lack of alternatives for providing needed services 
or status to their children.61 Rather than recognize or remedy the lack of 
better alternatives, society instead assigns the blame to parents for their 
children’s need to enter those systems. Discourse from both sides of the aisle 
consistently references the innocence of children in these systems—explicitly 
or implicitly in contrast to the blameworthiness of their parents.62 As Naomi 
 
59 See generally ROBERTS, supra note 3. 
60 See generally Anita Ortiz Maddali, Left Behind: The Dying Principle of Family Reunification 
Under Immigration Law, 50 U. MICH. J. L. REFORM 107 (2016). As a more general matter, even when 
developed countries allow for migration, legal status is seen as a benefit bestowed on migrants out 
of the receiving country’s generosity, a framework that itself has been called into question as masking 
the role of those receiving countries in creating the global conditions that necessitate migration, and 
then perpetuating the violence and harsh conditions that migrants are escaping as a requisite to 
receiving those benefits. See Eddie Bruce-Jones, Refugee Law in Crisis: Decolonizing the Architecture of 
Violence, in RACE, CRIMINAL JUSTICE, AND MIGRATION CONTROL 176, 183 (Bosworth, Parmar, & 
Vasquez eds., 2018). 
61 See supra notes 9-12, 46-48 and accompanying text. 
62 See, e.g., Proclamation No. 9374,83 Fed. Reg. 19,895 (Apr. 30, 2018) (“We also observe this 
month, with sadness, the plight of innocent children who are in foster care because their lives have 
been disrupted by neglect or abuse.”); Cory Gardner, It is Unfair to Deny Innocent Immigrant Children 
Legal Status, in ILLEGAL IMMIGRATION (quoting Rep. Cory Gardner’s testimony advocating for a 
path to legal status for dreamers because “[w]hile these children remain innocent, we cannot reward 
those family members who have broken the law.”); About the Children, ADOPT U.S. KIDS, 
https://www.adoptuskids.org/meet-the-children/children-in-foster-care/about-the-children 
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Glenn-Levin Rodriguez puts it, “‘[W]orthy’ child migrants are juxtaposed with 
the popular conception of the unworthy migrant, a symbolic reference to 
migrants who ostensibly seek to benefit from services and opportunities that they 
have not, through some broad category of suffering, such as abuse, abandonment, 
or trafficking, come to ‘deserve.’”63 This tendency is part of a much larger history 
of discrimination against poor, minority, and immigrant families.64 
Families are forced into SIJS because of a lack of migratory alternatives. 
SIJS is one of the very few options available to a large number of 
undocumented youth living in the country, and particularly the 
unaccompanied minors from Central America.65 Other common paths to 
legal status such as asylum, T visas, or U visas all require youth who have 
undergone severe trauma to be adjudicated in the same way as adults.66 They 
have no additional right to counsel, and must meet the same already 
demanding standards for evidence and credibility as adults.67 The lack of 
migratory options for youth and their families in the U.S. is the result of 
immigration laws that seek to limit immigrants seen as undesirable and labels 
poverty as an illegitimate reason to migrate.68 Most adults gain legal status 
through family petitions, but the severe limitations on the number of family 
visas available69 and the obstacles to adjusting status, such as the 10-year bar 
to reentry,70 combine to preclude even adults who have lived for years in the 
United States from gaining legal status, and by extension from sponsoring 
 
[https://perma.cc/9XQS-XZMQ] (“Children and teens enter foster care through no fault of 
their own, because they have been abused, neglected, or abandoned . . . .”); Sarah Harmeyer, 
It’s Really That Bad. The Secret of the Hidden Children, FOR EVERY MOM (Mar. 14, 2017), 
https://foreverymom.com/family-parenting/its-really-that-bad-the-secret-of-the-hidden-children-
sarah-harmeyer/ [https://perma.cc/2QCJ-F7SQ] (“It isn’t their fault their parents were selling 
drugs. It isn’t their fault the grownups in their lives tried to solve problems by beating each other 
up. It isn’t their fault that someone got shot.”). 
63 NAOMI GLENN-LEVIN RODRIGUEZ, FRAGILE FAMILIES: FOSTER CARE, IMMIGRATION, 
AND CITIZENSHIP 44 (2017). 
64 For a broad overview of how the United States has historically treated both citizens of color 
and immigrants, and how the discrimination against both groups can be illuminated through a 
comparative perspective, see generally Kevin R. Johnson, Race, the Immigration Laws, and Domestic 
Race Relations: A “Magic Mirror” into the Heart of Darkness, 73 IND. L.J. 1111 (1998). 
65 See Chiara Galli, Protecting Children? Assessing the Treatment of Unaccompanied Minors in the 
U.S., LATINO PUB. POL. Spring 2018, at 2, 12-13 (describing the narrow avenues for relief available 
to unaccompanied youth apprehended at the border, among which SIJS is prevalent). 
66 See Heidbrink, supra note 57, at 18-19 (describing how alternative forms of immigration relief 
are ill-suited to the procedural and substantive needs of youth). 
67 Id. 
68 GLENN-LEVIN RODRIGUEZ, supra note 63, at 21-22. 
69 Maddali, supra note 60, at 119. 
70 Id. at 136-37 (describing how backlogs impose delay on adults attempting to adjust status); 
Id. at 153-54 (describing the harsh time penalties on reentry for adults who have violated 
immigration laws). 
2020] "Best" Interests and "Bad" Parents 527 
their own children.71 This instability of status is then passed on to youth that 
hope to qualify for an ever-shrinking range of options for legal status.72 
Even youth that do qualify for SIJS frequently feel conflicted about the 
need to paint one or both of their parents as abusive, but choose to do so 
because of the lack of other viable options for immigration relief. Although 
impossible to quantify, anecdotal evidence regarding such conflicted feelings 
abounds. One immigration attorney explained that her SIJS clients were 
“reluctant to give us the information we need to throw their parents under 
the bus.”73 In a qualitative study, researcher Lauren Heidbrink presented the 
experiences of two SIJS-eligible youth in Office of Refugee Resettlement 
(ORR) detention and their feelings about painting their parents as abusive.74 
In one case, after “understanding that her release from detention . . . was 
contingent upon her claim of SIJ, [she] astutely explained to me, ‘My mom 
has to be the bad one. She wants the best for me. She will understand[.]’”75 
In contrast, another youth “recognized that his release was contingent upon 
securing SIJ, yet he could not reconcile his attorney’s depictions of his parents 
with his understanding of their realities and motivations[,]” eventually 
choosing to abandon his case and return to his home country instead.76 
Although youth and parents alike choose to apply for SIJS because the 
benefits of that child receiving legal status outweigh the costs, those benefits 
come with real consequences for the parents. SIJS doesn’t allow the youth, 
even after gaining citizenship, to sponsor either parent, even one that is not 
abusive.77 This rule—which may have made sense when the child needed to 
show abuse, abandonment, or neglect from both parents—is now 
unnecessarily punitive, particularly for the parent that a state court has found 
is the most suitable custodial guardian for the child.78 It also strips the 
naturalized SIJS recipient of one of the rights of citizenship, in effect making 
 
71 Id. at 138 (noting that parents with status can sponsor a child without it, but a child with 
status cannot sponsor a parent without it, meaning that “in a growing number of cases, it is children 
. . . who would, but for the asymmetry just mentioned, have the right to establish family unity 
around them.”). 
72 See Heidbrink, supra note 57, at 12 (explaining how immigration law “recogiz[es] the identity 
of a child only inasmuch as that child is a derivative of the actions, legal status, and presence of his 
or her parent(s)”). 
73 Interview with Stephanie Lubert, Staff Attorney, Hebrew Immigrant Aid Society of 
Pennsylvania, in Philadelphia, Pa. (Jan. 8, 2019). 
74 Heidbrink, supra note 57, at 22-24. 
75 Id. at 23. 
76 Id. at 24. 
77 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(27)(J)(iii)(II) (2018). 
78 Javeria Ahmed, No Parents Allowed: The Problem with Special Immigrant Juvenile Status, 24 
CARDOZO J. EQUAL RTS. & SOC. JUST. 131, 133-34 (2017). 
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him or her a second-class citizen.79 Guardianship offers no protection from 
deportation for an undocumented parent or custodian, despite the finding of 
a state court that placement with that caretaker is in the child’s best 
interests.80 This process ultimately subjects the family to additional 
uncertainty and trauma.81 
Similarly, families resort to voluntary placement of their children in foster 
care when they cannot access meaningful support any other way. Most youth 
enter the foster care system for reasons related to poverty, such as a shortage 
of food in the home, unstable living conditions, or lack of supervision while 
parents are working.82 For families whose children have serious physical or 
behavioral health problems, the challenges of living in poverty are 
compounded.83 Medicaid may not cover needed treatment or a healthcare 
provider willing to accept Medicaid may not be available.84 Others may fear 
for their child’s safety. One devoted father described his heartbreaking 
decision to place his daughter in foster care after numerous violent outbursts 
in which she bit her classmates and a police officer, and his disappointment 
in the difficult process of regaining custody:85 “When I saw her shaking like 
that, I started crying myself . . . . I thought she was going to come out all 
right. I thought by this time, she’d be back home again.”86 These conditions 
 
79 See Scharf, supra note 54, at 586, 629-30 (claiming that this rule is an unconstitutional class-
based distinction that turns naturalized SIJS recipients into second-class citizens). 
80 See Ahmed, supra note 78, at 142-43 (arguing that this provision violates the Equal 
Protection Clause). 
81 See RANDY CAPPS ET. AL., MIGRATION POL’Y INST. & URBAN INST., IMPLICATIONS OF 
IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT ACTIVITIES FOR THE WELL-BEING OF CHILDREN IN 
IMMIGRANT FAMILIES 9-11 (2015) (describing the long-term toxic stress and trauma experienced 
by children in families where the constant threat of separation looms large). 
82 AFCARS REPORT, supra note 13; EUBANKS, supra note 21. 
83 See Sengupta, supra note 27 (describing how the stresses of a child with major emotional and 
behavioral needs are exacerbated for “parents who don’t have a support system or the economic 
means to purchase a support system”). 
84 See Julia Zer, MaryBeth Musumeci, & Rachel Garfield, Medicaid’s Role in Financing 
Behavioral Health Services for Low-Income Individuals, KAISER FAM. FOUND. (June 29, 2017), 
https://www.kff.org/medicaid/issue-brief/medicaids-role-in-financing-behavioral-health-services-
for-low-income-individuals/ [https://perma.cc/DM32-6CAG] (describing how approximately 2.5 
million people with Medicaid reported an unmet need for mental health treatment in 2015). This is 
a problem for youth as well: In 2015, only 39.3% of youth aged 12-17 who had suffered a major 
depressive episode in the previous year received any type of treatment at all. Results from the 2015 
National Survey on Drug Use and Health, CTR. FOR BEHAV. HEALTH STAT. & QUALITY, Table 11.3B 
(Sept. 8, 2016), https://www.samhsa.gov/data/sites/default/files/NSDUH-DetTabs-2015/NSDUH-
DetTabs-2015/NSDUH-DetTabs-2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/X77D-TVQ8]. 
85 Sengupta, supra note 27. 
86 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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do not exist independently; they are a result of an insufficient and 
inconsistent social safety net that fails to meet the needs of poor families.87 
More recently, the foster care system has been criticized for failing to 
provide meaningful economic assistance to families that would not only create 
better conditions for children, but would also be less expensive for child 
welfare agencies in the long run.88 Still, most federal child welfare spending 
continues to be poured into the foster care system,89 instead of alternative 
forms of support for struggling families. Each state implements child welfare 
programs using a mix of federal, state, and local funds, with the primary 
sources of federal funds being Title IV-B and Title IV-E of the Social Security 
Act.90 Title IV-E provides federal funding to states for foster care, adoption 
assistance, guardianship assistance (referred to in this Comment as kinship 
care), and the Chafee Foster Care Independence Program.91 Notably, it does 
not provide any funding for programs where the child remains at home.92 In 
contrast, Title IV-B has a wider mandate, but most of the money received 
through those programs goes to programs after the child has been removed 
from the home rather than supporting reunified families.93 Although 
reunification is the most common outcome for youth exiting foster care, most 
post-permanency spending by states goes to adoptive parents.94 Of the IV-B 
Subpart 1 funds, which are broadly discretionary, states spent on average 
 
87 See Frank Edwards, Saving Children, Controlling Families: Punishment, Redistribution, and Child 
Protection, 81 AM. SOC. REV. 575, 586 (2016) (finding a higher rate of foster care entry in states with 
less generous and more complex welfare programs); see also Eduardo Porter, Patching Up the Social 
Safety Net, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 17, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/18/business/patching-up-
the-social-safety-net.html [https://perma.cc/ZT6B-9QTC] (arguing that the redistributive focus of 
social spending ultimately undermines the generousness of those programs); Sarah Bruck, Inequalities 
in U.S. ‘Safety Net’ Programs for the Poor, SCHOLARS’ STRATEGY NETWORK (Nov. 13, 2015), 
https://journalistsresource.org/studies/government/congress/inequalities-safety-net-programs-poor/ 
[https://perma.cc/JUZ4-W76B] (describing major variations among states for welfare benefits); Social 
Expenditures Database, OECD, http://www.oecd.org/social/expenditure.htm (showing a relatively low 
level of public social spending for the U.S. as compared to other developed countries). 
88 See ROBERTS, supra note 3, at 133-35 (describing how successful family preservation programs 
cost the state less and avoid the trauma of removal); see also Edwards, supra note 87, at 576 (“The 
extent to which a state prefers punitive or redistributive strategies for addressing social problems 
affects both the frequency of child protection intervention and the character of those interventions.”). 
89 John Sciamanna, Reunification of Foster Children with Their Families: The First Permanency 
Outcome 7, FIRST FOCUS (Oct. 2013), https://firstfocus.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/Reunification-
of-Foster-Children-with-their-Families.pdf [https://perma.cc/E2GS-XXQN]. 
90 Kerry DeVooght & Hope Cooper, Child Welfare Financing in the United States 3, STATE POL’Y 
ADVOC. & REFORM CTR. (Feb. 2012), https://childwelfaresparc.files.wordpress.com/2013/02/child-
welfare-financing-in-the-united-states-final.pdf [https://perma.cc/7ET4-8JQH]. 
91 Id. at 5. 
92 Sciamanna, supra note 89, at 1. 
93 Id. 
94 Id. at 1, 5. 
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forty-four percent of that funding on child protective services in 2017, 
compared to only twelve percent on family preservation.95 
The insufficiency of public safety nets and the overwhelming centrality of 
foster care to child welfare services combine to put poor families raising a 
child with physical or mental disabilities in an especially precarious position 
with few other options to turn to but an out-of-home placement. When 
children enter foster care through voluntary placements, they are on average 
older and far more likely to have a disability diagnosis.96 While voluntary 
placements are supposed to facilitate connections between parents and youth, 
children who enter foster care through voluntary placements spend a longer 
amount of time in care, have more placements, and are more likely to enter a 
group home or an institution than are youth in the foster care system as a 
whole.97 This raises questions about “the supports and systems available for 
children with disabilities and their families in the community . . . and about 
the use of child welfare to connect families of children with disabilities with 
the interventions they need.”98 Raising children with severe mental health 
needs can cause major financial hardship even for middle class families, due 
to both direct costs such as higher out-of-pocket co-pays and uncovered 
services99 and indirect costs such as lost wages or employment because of time 
spent treating and caring for the child.100 Parents, particularly poor parents 
working with insufficient public resources, may not be able to access services 
that their children need without placing them into care.101 Accessing needed 
services without turning to foster care is particularly difficult for families of 
color, who are less likely to be diagnosed with mental health disorders and 
“receive less care and of poorer quality” when they are.102 
 
95 CHILDREN’S BUREAU, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., REPORT TO 
CONGRESS ON STATE CHILD WELFARE EXPENDITURES 2 (2017). The nondiscretionary Subpart 
2 funding of Title IV-B is divided into “Crisis Intervention (Family Preservation),” “Prevention and 
Support Services,” “Time-Limited Family Reunification Services,” and “Adoption Promotion and 
Support Services,” with states spending about an equal amount on each. Id. at 3. 
96 Hill, supra note 28, at 66-67. 
97 Id. at 67. 
98 Id. at 68; see also Eileen Brennan & Frances Lynch, Economic Impact and Supports, in WORK, 
LIFE, AND THE MENTAL HEALTH SYSTEM OF CARE 251 (Rosenzweig & Brennan eds., 2008) 
(indicating that “relinquishment of children to state custody to obtain needed mental health 
services” can be the “only way out for families who cannot afford or access services they feel their 
child must have, including residential treatment.”). 
99 Brennan & Lynch, supra note 98, at 242-43. 
100 Id. at 244-48. 
101 Id. at 251. 
102 See Julie Rosenzweig & Judy Kendall, Inside the Family: Insights and Experiences of Family 
Members, in WORK, LIFE, AND THE MENTAL HEALTH SYSTEM OF CARE 79 (Rosenzweig & 
Brennan eds., 2008) (describing how discrimination from health care providers, combined with “an 
understandable lack of trust of the treatment system in ethnic minority communities” leads to 
underdiagnosis and undertreatment). A similar dynamic exists more broadly in child welfare, where 
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Families resort to both voluntary placement and SIJS after they have 
already been forced into situations with no good alternatives. Youth who are 
searching for a better future in this country or seeking to reunite with family 
members here that lack status have few other options to gain legal status 
beside SIJS. Youth in desperate need of medical or behavioral interventions 
who cannot afford private treatment often turn to voluntary placements as 
the only viable means of receiving those services.103 SIJS and voluntary 
placements would not likely be the first choice of most of the individuals who 
utilize those processes; they were simply the only choices they had. 
But a lack of other options is not the only parallel. Both voluntary 
placements and SIJS exist within systems that insist that the lack of options 
was the result of decisions made by those youth and their families, rather than 
recognizing the larger systemic inequalities and failures of the immigration 
and welfare systems that created those situations. Then, adding insult to 
injury, both systems villainize parents that are forced into them for not having 
avoided those impossible choices. In SIJS, parents who lack status to sponsor 
their children as legal immigrants are blamed for having chosen to reside here 
without authorization; this ignores the scarcity of paths to legal status that 
would allow them to do so.104 Parents who act in their children’s best interests 
by sending them to a better and safer life in the U.S. may find that very action 
forming the foundation of a charge of abuse, abandonment, and neglect 
against them.105 In voluntary placements, parents who cannot afford or access 
the services that their children need end up relinquishing custody of their 
children to foster care, and are then viewed with suspicion or hostility by the 
system for their inability to provide for their children.106 Any entry into the 
 
poor families are rightfully hesitant to ask for help, as any contact with the system increases the 
likelihood that they will be targeted for supervision, particularly through the use of high-tech 
algorithms that flag families as high-risk. See EUBANKS, supra note 21, at 161-63 (describing how 
“[p]arenting while poor means parenting in public,” and the ripple effects that it has on how families 
perceive even child welfare services that do not result in removal of their children). 
103 Sengupta, supra note 27; supra notes 96-102 and accompanying text. 
104 See GLENN-LEVIN RODRIGUEZ, supra note 63, at 73 (arguing that “the systemic removal 
of children whose parents are caught up in immigration enforcement actions is rooted in a politics 
of citizenship that categorizes undocumented parents as irredeemably ‘unfit’”). For an example of 
such rhetoric, see Fox News, ICE Director: Illegal Immigrant Parents Using Kids as Pawns, YOUTUBE 
(Jun. 18, 2018), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RN7YvIxhugI [https://perma.cc/CC62-MJYX] 
(“As far as separation of families are [sic] concerned, you have to put the blame on the parents.”). 
105 See J. Weston Phippen, Young, Illegal and Alone, THE ATLANTIC, Oct. 15, 2015 (describing 
the story of a child whose journey to the U.S. formed the basis of a claim of abandonment and abuse 
against his father). 
106 See Barbara J. Friesen & Nancy M. Koroloff, Giving Up Custody to Obtain Services: 
Overall and Multicultural Implications 12 (Mar. 1991), https://www.pathwaysrtc.pdx
.edu/pdf/pbGivingUpCustody.pdf [https://perma.cc/L4TG-34UA] (describing the additional 
stigma poor parents face when voluntarily placing their children into care, and quoting one parent 
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foster care system leads to parents being characterized as bad caretakers and 
criticized for failing to care for their child, even when parents turn to the 
foster care system to ensure a better outcome for their child. 
Society’s nonchalance about assigning blame to these parents rather than 
recognizing systemic injustice is hardly a coincidence when we consider who 
those parents are. There is a long history in this country of blaming the poor, 
and particularly poor minorities, for their own hardships.107 Parents who are 
blamed for their children’s involvement with foster care or SIJS are from 
those same populations. No other immigration process besides SIJS includes 
a child’s best interests as a consideration at all—only when the best interests 
of a child are pitted against those of a “bad” parent do they seem to matter to 
the state for determining immigration benefits.108 Likewise, society 
disparages families that rely on public assistance, decreases the availability of 
that assistance, and then labels placements as voluntary when they were more 
likely the only viable choice within that family’s means.109 Rhetoric about so-
called illegal immigrants and welfare mothers appeals to the same underlying 
notion: that those individuals chose—out of laziness,110 immorality,111 or 
 
who gave up custody in order to obtain services as saying “[t]hrough the judge’s eyes we were seen 
as neglectful. The pain and frustration of that experience was humiliating to us as parents”). 
107 For a more detailed look at this history of blame and discrimination, see DOROTHY ROBERTS, 
KILLING THE BLACK BODY: RACE, REPRODUCTION, AND THE MEANING OF LIBERTY 203-09 (1997) 
(“Black mothers’ inclusion in welfare programs once reserved for white women soon became 
stigmatized as dependency and proof of Black people’s lack of work ethic and social depravity.”); Beth 
Mandel, The White Fist of the Child Welfare System: Racism, Patriarchy, and the Presumptive Removal of 
Children from Victims of Domestic Violence in Nicholson v. Williams, 73 U. CIN. L. REV. 1131, 1154 (2005) 
(“[M]odern welfare discourse scapegoats poor Black mothers and blames poverty on the breakdown of 
the nuclear family and the alleged ‘inherent degeneracy’ of the Black race.”). 
108 See Heidbrink, supra note 57, at 2 (“SIJ is the only provision in immigration law that 
considers the child’s best interest.”). This is particularly striking when compared with the process 
through which many undocumented adults in removal proceedings must seek relief: cancellation of 
removal. Cancellation requires “extreme and exceptionally unusual hardship” to a qualifying citizen 
or LPR relative, a notably higher standard that explicitly only weighs the interests of a qualifying 
child in comparison to all others, resulting in a “race to the bottom” in which “if the government is 
abusing everyone or a ‘similarly situated’ subset of people equally, the hardship imposed by the 
government is acceptable.” Becky Wolozin, Doing What’s Best: Determining Best Interests for Children 
Impacted by Immigration Proceedings, 64 DRAKE L. REV. 141, 169-70 (2016). 
109 Friesen & Koroloff, supra note 106, at 5. 
110 For example, take Senator Hatch’s reluctance to renew funding for the Children’s Health 
Insurance Program because, in his words, “I have a rough time wanting to spend billions and billions 
and trillions of dollars to help people who won’t help themselves, won’t lift a finger and expect the 
federal government to do everything.” Rachel Black & Aleta Sprague, Republicans are Bringing 
‘Welfare Queen’ Politics to the Tax Cut Fight, WASH. POST (Dec. 8, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost
.com/news/posteverything/wp/2017/12/08/republicans-are-bringing-welfare-queen-politics-to-the-
tax-cut-fight/?utm_term=.738d1dce1786 [https://perma.cc/Z7ZH-9HC6]. 
111 Senator Grassley expressed his opposition to helping individuals who “are just spending 
every darn penny they have, whether it’s on booze or women or movies.” Id. The article goes on to 
point out that such rhetoric is “grounded in narratives, cultivated over centuries, that portray black 
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criminal intent112—to end up in their particular situation. By casting parents 
in this role, societal discourse assigns them the blame for not only their own 
misfortunes, but also their children’s circumstances. It is easier to scapegoat 
“bad” parents for harming innocent children than it is to accept societal 
responsibility for the positions that they are in, particularly when those families 
are poor and minority families that have historically been scapegoated. 
B. SIJS and Kinship Care: A Comparison 
In addition to punishing and blaming undesirable parents, both SIJS and 
foster care fail to respect nontraditional family models and the agency of 
individuals in them. For centuries in which families of color were excluded 
from state child welfare programs, extended family and community child care 
networks were a necessary response to poverty and marginalization, that were 
then used as evidence of bad parenting.113 Families separated by rigid 
immigration laws similarly adapt by relying on extended family and community 
networks to support youth.114 Rather than recognize the resilience and strength 
of these relationships, both foster care and the current immigration laws 
continue to hold up the nuclear family as the most desirable model.115 Even 
 
Americans, especially black women, with suspicion and derision. These narratives create the 
justification for punitive and paternalistic treatment of the working poor while bestowing generous 
giveaways to the wealthy under the pretense of merit.” Id. 
112 See Daniel E. Martinez et. al., Sanctuary Cities and Crime, in ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK ON 
IMMIGRATION AND CRIME 277-78 (Ventura Miller & Peguero, eds., 2018) (tracing the history of, 
and debunking, the “immigrant-crime link”); Yolanda Vasquez, Enforcing the Politics of Race and Identity 
in Migration and Crime Control Policies, in RACE, CRIMINAL JUSTICE, AND MIGRATION CONTROL 
143-45 (Bosworth, Parmar, & Vasquez, eds., 2018) (describing how immigration laws and public 
discourse have created the concept of the “criminal alien” that is additionally racialized as Latino). 
113 This has been the case particularly for Black families, for whom the need for communal 
child-rearing is rooted in slavery and continued through their formal exclusion from segregated child 
welfare services until the middle of the twentieth century. Roberts, supra note 35, at 1621-22; see also 
Bass, supra note 5, at 76 (discussing how the institution of slavery shaped African American family 
life). Similarly, suspicion of communal child-rearing was one of the primary cultural biases that led 
to the widespread removal of Native American children from their homes that eventually resulted 
in the landmark Indian Child Welfare Act. See Lorie M. Graham, “The Past Never Vanishes”: A 
Contextual Critique of the Existing Indian Family Doctrine, 23 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 1, 25 (1998) (“The 
cultural values and social norms of Native American families—particularly indigenous child rearing 
practices— were viewed institutionally as the antithesis of a modern-day ‘civilized’ society. . . . This 
disparity in viewpoint was the result of general disdain for American Indian family life.”). 
114 See Claire Podgorski & Carolyn Rumer, Effects of Immigration on the Family, 3 INST. FOR 
LATINO STUD., UNIV. OF NOTRE DAME STUDENT RESEARCH SERIES, Fall 2009, no. 1 at 1, 12-13, 
https://latinostudies.nd.edu/assets/95243/original/3.1_effects_of_immigration.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/BGS5-P89F] (describing the U.S. legal system as an external pressure shaping 
immigrant family life, not only by defining who counts as a family member but also by shifting 
power dynamics within those families). 
115 See ROBERTS, supra note 3, at 195 (“Whereas single welfare recipients must take paid jobs, 
more affluent mothers are expected to stay home full-time to care for their children. Middle-class 
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when foster care and immigration policy recognize nontraditional family 
structures as in the child’s best interests, they condition their support and 
benefits on state approval, increased surveillance, and control. This mistrust 
and disregard for the autonomy of nontraditional families stems once again 
from society’s disdain for the families involved in those systems. 
SIJS, and immigration law more generally, fail to recognize nontraditional 
and extended family structures that are so common in multinational families. 
Unaccompanied minors who emigrate to the U.S. without an adult guardian 
clearly do not conform to a traditional family model, but neither do parents 
working in the U.S. to support children abroad, siblings in the same families 
with different legal status or different countries of residence, or youth 
entering the country to live with older siblings or extended family 
members.116 Yet, the cornerstone of immigration policy—family petitions—
presumes a nuclear family as well as traditional gender roles.117 Historically, 
immigration law has ignored the agency of women, making them dependent 
(first statutorily and later in practice) on male partners, either as sponsors or 
victims of abuse.118 Although the Trump administration’s family separation 
policy sparked outrage in the summer of 2018, it was not the first time 
immigrant families were separated based in part on the same outdated ideas 
of family models and gender roles.119 So-called “[f]amily detention,” in which 
mothers were detained with children and fathers were separated from their 
families, was in fact a “cornerstone of Obama’s second term.”120 
 
mothers are supposed to depend on their husband’s income to meet their financial needs.”); Maddali, 
supra note 60, at 112 (describing the historic privileging of the nuclear family model in immigration 
law). 
116 The prevalence of mixed-status families is by no means limited to youth applying for SIJS. 
In fact, thirty percent of youth living in an immigrant family having at least one undocumented 
parent. RANDY CAPPS, MICHAEL FIX & JIE ZONG, MIGRATION POL’Y INST., A PROFILE OF U.S. 
CHILDREN WITH UNAUTHORIZED IMMIGRANT PARENTS 9 tbl. 2 (2016), https://
www.migrationpolicy.org/research/profile-us-children-unauthorized-immigrant-parents [https://
perma.cc/LX39-WM2J]. Likewise, nearly 6 million U.S. children have at least one family member, 
often a parent, who is undocumented. AM. IMMIGRATION COUNCIL, U.S. CITIZEN CHILDREN 
IMPACTED BY IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT (2018), https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil
.org/research/us-citizen-children-impacted-immigration-enforcement [https://perma.cc/QKF9-Z3V5]. 
117 Maddali, supra note 60, at 133-34. 
118 See generally Maddali, supra note 60, which traces the rhetoric and motivations regarding 
the ideal of family reunification in U.S. immigration law, arguing that even at its most principled, 
the immigration system has presumed and privileged heteronormative, male-led, nuclear families, a 
model that “no longer reflects the modern family (perhaps it never did) and is unresponsive to the 
needs of those families.” Id. at 112-13. 
119 César Cuauhtémoc García Hernández, Cruel and Immoral: America Must Close the Doors of 
its Immigration Prisons, THE GUARDIAN, Jun. 17, 2018, https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree
/2018/jun/17/family-separation-family-detention-immigration [https://perma.cc/2LMB-HKBK]. 
120 Id. 
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SIJS extends those presumptions to youth. Many SIJS cases are one-
parent cases in which the non-custodial parent has abused, abandoned, or 
neglected the child. The cases in which this most straightforwardly fits with 
the lived reality of SIJS-eligible youth is when there is an absentee parent 
who has abandoned the family; however, cases with only findings of 
abandonment are being treated more skeptically under the current 
administration.121 In cases where both parents are part of a child’s life but one 
is living abroad, the parent seeking custody and the child are often forced to 
depict the parent living abroad as abusive, neglectful, or abandoning. For 
example, 15-year-old Guillermo was forced to flee his home in El Salvador, 
where he had grown up with his father, when gangs threatened to kill him 
and his family.122 Once reunited with his mother in the U.S., his best chance 
to avoid deportation and certain death was to apply for SIJS.123 In order to 
do so, “Guillermo’s father, who’d taken out a $7,500 loan to pay for his journey 
to America, now had to declare that he’d failed to protect his son— and 
legally disown him.”124 
This imperfect fit between the presumption of a traditional family 
structure and reality is particularly apparent in the case of non-parent 
sponsors for SIJS, who are usually extended family members or close friends. 
SIJS requires a sponsor, either through the state child welfare system or a 
custody order granted by a court.125 SIJS thereby forces non-parent sponsors 
into an adversarial custody process against the parents, when in reality they 
may have a more flexible co-parenting relationship necessitated by geographic 
and economic limitations. Parents who have entrusted these extended family 
members and friends to care for their children in their absence may maintain 
close communication and contact with both the sponsors and their children. 
Despite the existence of this extended caretaking network, the sponsor must 
challenge the parent(s) in an adversarial proceeding in which the sponsor 
shows that the parents have mistreated their child, potentially damaging 
relationships between the parents and the sponsors as well as the parents 
and their children.126 
 
121 See Katie Annand, Andrea Del-Pan & Rachel Prandini, Guidance for SIJS State Court 
Predicate Orders in California, IMMIGRANT LEGAL RESOURCE CTR. 2 (2017), https://www.ilrc.org/
new-guidance-sijs-state-court-predicate-orders-california [https://perma.cc/N3JW-ZC9R] (“USCIS 
has increased scrutiny of SIJS state court predicate orders in recent years.”). 
122 Phippen, supra note 105. 
123 Id. 
124 Id. 
125 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(27)(J)(i) (2018). 
126 See Heidbrink, supra note 57, at 2 (“[T]he relationships between unaccompanied children 
and their kin are getting strained and, in some instances, severed.”). 
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Kinship care developed as an acknowledgement of similar nontraditional 
family and community structures and their benefits for children.127 It is 
associated with many positive outcomes for youth when compared to non-
family placements, such as better self-esteem, fewer placements, and greater 
ease of maintaining a relationship with parents.128 Extended family members, 
such as grandparents, can access the economic supports of foster care that a 
family desperately needs while still giving children a sense of security.129 
Both SIJS and kinship care offer important and needed state supports for 
families and children. In both programs, however, the price of those benefits 
is state surveillance and intrusion into the family. States vary in the 
requirements for kinship care providers to become licensed, and in most 
states the level of licensing is directly tied to the financial support a family 
receives.130 Those who oppose the expansion of kinship care do so by 
highlighting the “undeserving” nature of the extended family members that 
provide those services, even framing cases where youth retained ties with 
their parents as negative examples that undermine the goals of the system to 
keep children away from their “bad” parents.131 
Likewise, SIJS sponsors, whether parents or guardians, must convince a 
court that they are the most suitable home for that child to be awarded 
custody in the underlying state court proceeding.132 This oversight reflects 
 
127 Roberts, supra note 113, at 1622-23. 
128 Michele Cranwell Schmidt & Julie Treinen, Using Kinship Navigation Services to Support the 
Family Resource Needs, Caregiver Self-Effi cacy, and Placement Stability of Children in Informal and Formal 
Kinship Care, 95 CHILD WELFARE 69, 70-71 (2017); Meredith L. Alexander, Note, Harming 
Vulnerable Children: The Injustice of California’s Kinship Foster Care Policy, 7 HASTINGS RACE & 
POVERTY L.J. 381, 393-96 (2010). 
129 Alexander, supra note 128, at 400. 
130 See Olivia Golden & Jennifer Macomber, The Adoption and Safe Families Act (ASFA), in 
INTENTIONS AND RESULTS: A LOOK BACK AT THE ADOPTION AND SAFE FAMILIES ACT 19 
(2009) (“In most but not all states, higher payment has followed higher standards.”); Supporting 
Relative Caregivers of Children, NAT’L CONF. OF STATE LEGIS. (Feb. 13, 2017), http://www.ncsl.org
/research/human-services/relative-caregivers.aspx [https://perma.cc/GM6D-4X9D] (giving an 
overview of state legislation regarding the regulation of kinship care). 
131 For example, Maggie Gallagher argued in an op-ed that kinship care “threatens to turn a 
vital child-protection service into a supplementary welfare program, squandering resources meant 
for profoundly troubled families, marooning children in foster care far longer than is appropriate, 
and threatening the integrity of the system itself.” She then proposed that the costs of foster care to 
the state be reduced by encouraging relatives to adopt, and expressed optimism that this plan would 
be successful because “[t]he many grandmothers who have themselves been abused by their addict 
daughters might be more than willing to cooperate with authorities . . . in order to protect their 
grandchildren.” Maggie Gallagher, Foster Care as Welfare, CITY J. (Summer 1991), https://www.city-
journal.org/html/foster-care-welfare-12751.html [https://perma.cc/6KWZ-F2FF]. 
132 See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(27)(J)(i) (2018) (requiring a state court order placing the child in 
custody of the state or an individual). The standards for receiving the underlying custody order will 
vary by state, but often include a showing that custody with that sponsor is in the child’s best 
interest. See, e.g., 23 Pa. C.S. § 5323a (2019) (“[T]he court may award . . . custody if it is in the best 
interest of the child”). 
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the suspicion and disrespect both systems harbor of these nontraditional 
families. Implicit in this distrust is the idea that the government is in a better 
position than the child’s parents, extended family, or community to determine 
what living arrangement is in the child’s best interests.133 Such an idea is 
tenable only because society already distrusts and disrespects those parents, 
and by extension their communities.134 
The oversight and surveillance that comes with participating in SIJS or 
kinship care is more than just an invasion of privacy; it often comes with 
adverse effects for the guardians who take on responsibility for these children. 
Although long-term placement in kinship care may be in a child’s best 
interests, the more recent push towards freeing children for adoption through 
the ASFA means that adults providing kinship care may be left with fewer 
legal rights to a child than they would have been otherwise, because foster 
parents are not given special standing in disputes that may arise over custody 
following a termination of parental rights.135 Additionally, the much-needed 
economic support that kinship care provides could create perverse incentives 
for delaying reunification with parents.136 
For undocumented parents or guardians that sponsor SIJS-eligible youth, 
the risks are even more pronounced, and they are put at direct risk for 
sponsoring their own children. In order to sponsor a child for release from 
federal custody with ORR, which is responsible for the custody of 
unaccompanied minors, an adult must provide his or her address, 
fingerprints, and other identifying information to the government, and 
potentially undergo a home study.137 In 2018, Immigration and Customs 
Enforcement (ICE) and ORR signed a memorandum of agreement allowing 
 
133 Wolozin, supra note 108, at 144-45. 
134 In analyzing the intersection between migrant families and foster care systems, Naomi 
Glenn Levin-Rodriguez eloquently places the distrust of those parents within a historical context 
that includes orphan trains and forced assimilation of Native American children. In her words: 
Child saving practices, and perhaps all forms of intervention into families, are fraught 
because intervention relies upon a normative sense of proper parenting. . . . Custody 
in such cases is determined by the belief that all children should be placed with families 
who are members of the dominant social group, usually white and Christian families: 
those best equipped to satisfy the ‘best interest’ of the children, at least under 
circumstances where poverty or an inferior position in an established racial hierarchy 
constitutes neglect and abuse. 
GLENN-LEVIN RODRIGUEZ, supra note 63, at 56-58. 
135 See Pamela Laufer-Ukeles, Money, Caregiving, and Kinship: Should Paid Caregivers Be Allowed 
to Obtain De Facto Parental Status?, 74 MO. L. REV. 25, 46-49, n.112 (2009) (arguing that foster 
parents should be given special de facto legal recognition in custody disputes). 
136 Roberts, supra note 35, at 1634-35. 
137 OFFICE OF REFUGEE RESETTLEMENT, ORR GUIDE: CHILDREN ENTERING THE 
UNITED STATES UNACCOMPANIED § 2.2.3-4 (2015), https://www.acf.hhs.gov/orr/resource/children-
entering-the-united-states-unaccompanied-section-2#2.2 [https://perma.cc/Y2KE-HLYQ]. 
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ICE to access information that ORR collects about sponsors; subsequently, 
at least 170 potential sponsors who came to the attention of the government 
after agreeing to sponsor a child for release were arrested by ICE in 2018.138 
Parents and guardians of SIJS-eligible youth may also come to the attention 
of ICE through information sharing from state agencies, mandatory 
fingerprinting in some courts,139 and even ICE arrests occurring in family 
courts.140 Undocumented parents and sponsors have no choice but to accept 
the risks associated with state oversight if they want to gain custody of their 
child or help their child apply for SIJS.141 
These surveillance and information-sharing practices fail to consider how 
some of the consequences of state oversight—such as potential detention and 
deportation—threaten the wellbeing and stability of the entire family.142 This 
disregard for the instability of immigrant families was captured in White 
House Chief of Staff John Kelly’s response to a question about the fate of 
immigrant children separated from their families: “The children will be taken 
care of—put into foster care or whatever.”143 While this statement was made 
 
138  NAT’L YOUTH LAW CTR., The Flores Settlement Agreements and Unaccompanied Children in 
Federal Custody 8 (Feb. 2019), https://youthlaw.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/Flores-
Congressional-Briefing.pdf [https://perma.cc/3UJT-5EZ6]; Sarah Ramey, Sponsors of Immigrant 
Children are Getting Arrested—We Must Protect Them, THE HILL (Oct. 9, 2018), https://thehill
.com/opinion/immigration/410596-sponsors-of-immigrant-children-are-getting-arrested-we-must-
protect-them [https://perma.cc/78LK-AJGB]. The use of children as “bait” to facilitate ICE arrests 
of their undocumented parents and sponsors is the subject of an ongoing class action lawsuit. Third 
Amended Complaint & Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus at 1, J.E.C.M. v. Hayes, No. 1:18-CV-
903-LMB (E.D. Va. Jan. 18, 2019) (acknowledging that the Trump administration used children 
detained by ORR to bait potential sponsors into providing identifying information). 
139 Advisory Memorandum from the Advisory Council on Immigration Issues in Family Court 
to the Chief Administrative Judge Lawrence Marks, 5-6 (Oct. 27, 2017). 
140  See generally SHELLER CTR. FOR SOC. JUSTICE AT TEMPLE LAW SCH., OBSTRUCTING 
JUSTICE: THE CHILLING EFFECT OF ICE’S ARRESTS OF IMMIGRANTS AT PENNSYLVANIA’S 
COURTHOUSEs (2019), https://www2.law.temple.edu/csj/publication/obstructing-justice-the-chilling-
effect-of-ices-arrests-of-immigrants-at-pennsylvanias-courthouses/ [https://perma.cc/A7PG-RPNE].  
141 Even when sponsors do take that risk, they may then face an additional hurdle of being 
denied custody for reasons related to poverty. The National Youth Law Center Congressional 
Briefing describes incidents of sponsors being denied custody unless they could move to a larger 
home or better neighborhood, reduce the number of other children living in their home, or afford 
psychotropic medicines prescribed by the government. In the poignant words of one child 
interviewed for that report, “I don’t fully understand why ORR won’t let me live with my sister, but 
I think it is because ORR thinks she doesn’t have enough money. I would prefer to live with my 
sister or family over foster care, and I believe even poor families have the right to live together.” 
Flores Settlement Agreement, supra note 138, at 10. 
142 See id. at 7 (“A longstanding body of research has established that detaining children 
interferes with healthy development, exposes youth to abuse, undermines educational attainment, 
makes mentally ill children worse, and puts children at greater risk of self-harm.”). 
143 Amy Davidson Sorkin, The Case of the Missing Immigrant Children, THE NEW YORKER 
(May 29, 2018), https://www.newyorker.com/news/daily-comment/the-case-of-the-missing-immi
grant-children [https://perma.cc/LB56-GYJ6]. 
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regarding unaccompanied minors rather than citizen or SIJS-eligible 
children whose parents had been deported,144 it embodies the callousness 
with which the current administration treats the stability and welfare of 
immigrant youth and families. 
In addition to their scrutiny and mistrust of nontraditional family 
structures, both the foster care and SIJS systems discount and minimize the 
agency of children themselves.145 By characterizing the internal dynamic of 
families that interface with SIJS and foster care as one of innocent children 
against bad parents, the voices of the children are lost. Older children may be 
active decision makers within their families and may make conscious choices 
about what is in their best interests, including whether they want to remain 
in foster care146 or to migrate.147 Despite this agency, youth are consistently 
seen as passive victims, rather than active decision makers who have chosen 
where and with whom they want to live. The idea that a child actively decided 
to migrate is even seen as suspect, potentially making that child unworthy of 
protection.148 It is telling that President Trump defended his administration’s 
treatment of unaccompanied youth by claiming that “[t]hey look so innocent. 
They’re not innocent.”149 Trump sought to demonize unaccompanied 
immigrant youth by associating them with crime, economic migration, and 
manipulation of immigration laws—associations usually reserved for their 
parents.150 In doing so, both his comment and the backlash against it implicitly 
affirmed a binary framework in which immigrant children can either be 
passive, innocent victims, or exercise agency and become evil and undeserving. 
Likewise, youth in the foster care system struggle to assert their own 
agency in a space that presumes that they cannot identify or achieve their 
own best interests.151 Most dependency courts do not require or even 
encourage youth to attend their own hearings, despite studies of former foster 
care youth that showed that attendance at hearings helped them to feel more 
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145 Maddali, supra note 60, at 107. 
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147 See Heidbrink, supra note 57, at 18 (“[I]nitial discussions of SIJ applicants operated on 
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or unlawful.”). 
148 GLENN-LEVIN RODRIGUEZ, supra note 63, at 21. 
149 Seung Min Kim, Trump Warns Against Admitting Unaccompanied Migrant Children: ‘They’re 
Not Innocent’, WASH. POST (May 23, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/trump-
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150 Id. 
151 See generally Lynn Nybell, Locating “Youth Voice”: Considering the Contexts of Speaking in Foster 
Care, 35 CHILD. & YOUTH SERVS. REV. 1227 (2013). 
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empowered and informed.152 In the courtroom or in a meeting with a case 
worker, youth have limited power to assert their opinions, and may be 
misunderstood or disregarded when they attempt to articulate their needs and 
desires.153 As one youth put it when reflecting on his experience in foster care, 
“All I ever wanted was to be heard and not just dismissed.”154 While framing 
youth—both in foster care and immigration proceedings—as innocent 
victims of bad parents may increase public sympathy for them, it also drowns 
out their voices and decisionmaking abilities within their families. 
III. INTERSECTIONS AND TENSIONS BETWEEN CHILD WELFARE AND 
SIJS 
While the parallels between SIJS and foster care are striking, the two 
processes intersect in more direct ways as well. Because SIJS was historically 
intertwined with the child welfare system,155 the influence of foster care 
proceedings continues to be apparent in SIJS proceedings even where there 
is no involvement from the child welfare agency.156 The motivations behind 
families seeking SIJS and families involved in the foster care system are 
distinct, and the arguments each group makes may appear to be in tension 
with each other. However, rather than treat this area as one where the 
interests of immigrant families and domestic families diverge, advocates 
should recognize how the systemic injustices discussed above lead to these 
divergent arguments and are rooted in the same foundation of discrimination 
against their clients. 
Notably, many SIJS-eligible youth are also in foster care.157 Some enter 
state foster care in the same ways that citizen youth do.158 In some cases, state 
agencies may even be resistant to assuming custody of immigrant youth, 
perhaps in part to avoid responsibility for their gaining SIJS.159 Detained 
youth who do not have a sponsor but have a high likelihood of success on a 
 
152 Khoury, supra note 146, at 145-46. 
153 See generally Nybell, supra note 151. 
154 Khoury, supra note 146, at 145. 
155 Daugherty, supra note 44, at 1092. 
156 Id. at 1098-99. 
157 Id. at 1103-04. 
158 See id. at 1102 (explaining that youth in foster care automatically satisfy the dependency 
prong of SIJS). 
159 See Randi Mandelbaum & Elissa Steglich, Disparate Outcomes: The Quest for Uniform 
Treatment of Immigrant Children, 50 FAM. CT. REV. 606, 610 (2012) (“At times... a youth simply does 
not come to the attention of the child protection agency. At other times, because a youth already has 
the support of an adult caregiver, often a relative, the child protection agency will determine that 
the youth is safe, no longer at risk of harm, and thus does not need the agency’s assistance.”). 
2020] "Best" Interests and "Bad" Parents 541 
petition for relief may also be placed in federal foster care.160 However, the 
shortage of federal foster care homes and the requirement of a custody order 
limit youth who lack a willing sponsor or are detained from applying for 
SIJS even if they would be eligible.161 A large proportion of youth in ORR 
custody who accept voluntary departure or are deported when they turn 
eighteen would have been eligible for SIJS, but could not access a state court 
to obtain the necessary predicate order.162 This problem will probably 
increase as adults who are fearful of interacting with the government become 
less likely to come forward to sponsor youth for their release. Due to fear 
caused by ORR’s increased cooperation with ICE and policies such as 
mandatory fingerprinting of potential sponsors, the number of youth in 
ORR custody increased by ninety-seven percent in 2018, despite the fact that 
the number of unaccompanied youth crossing the border remained constant 
during this time.163 While SIJS cases where a child is in ORR custody or 
state foster care present additional challenges and complexities, this 
Comment focuses on youth with a willing sponsor who must still navigate 
their way through state juvenile courts. 
For those youth, state courts have become immigration gatekeepers for 
the purpose of SIJS, and have done so in an inconsistent way across 
jurisdictions.164 One common way this happens is through state laws that 
limit access to dependency or custody hearings for youth over eighteen from 
receiving the underlying predicate order. Because of this, youth between 
eighteen and twenty-one are blocked from applying for SIJS even though the 
federal statute allows someone to apply until age twenty-one.165 Some 
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dependency courts are reluctant to open a case at all for a child in a safe living 
situation, perhaps due to lack of understanding of SIJS, limited resources of 
an overburdened system, or the belief that youth are gaming the system just 
to get status.166 This apprehension is apparent in the reasoning of one state 
court hesitant to even adjudicate one-parent SIJS cases following the 2008 
amendments. The court expressed its disbelief that 
a juvenile could apply for SIJS status, with its immigration advantages, even 
if that juvenile could be viably reunified with one parent who never abused, 
neglected, or abandoned the juvenile. Indeed, it would permit SIJS status 
even if that safe parent had raised the juvenile from birth, in love, comfort, 
and security . . . . 167 
USCIS mirrors this same hesitance from the state courts as a matter of 
policy, by scrutinizing state court orders to ensure that “the[se] juvenile court 
order[s] w[ere] sought to obtain relief from abuse, neglect, abandonment, or 
a similar basis under state law, and not primarily or solely to obtain an 
immigration benefit.”168 Furthermore, state courts consistently misunderstand 
their role in the SIJS process or include language opining on the merits of 
the child’s immigration application.169 
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While dependency hearings are not supposed to make permanent findings 
about the child’s best interest going forward or close the door to viable future 
reunification, SIJS requires these types of determinations.170 When 
adjudicating SIJS petitions, USCIS will routinely issue requests for 
additional evidence—delaying or even denying the SIJS application—if it 
believes that a child’s circumstances have or could change.171 For SIJS youth 
declared dependent on a juvenile court, the predicate order is issued through 
the dependency hearing process—routine hearings that take place 
periodically for youth and families under court supervision that are designed 
to track their progress toward a permanency goal.172 In dependency hearings, 
SIJS advocates try to elicit an immediate finding that reunification is not 
viable in order to get the predicate order needed to apply for SIJS, whereas 
child and parental advocates in dependency hearings try to prioritize 
reunification if it is viable rather than immediately terminate parental rights. 
In both systems, most cases are based on neglect rather than actual abuse, 
but SIJS applicants and families seeking to reunify or remain together often 
make divergent arguments about what is neglect and what is poverty. 
Conflating the two already disproportionately punishes poor families of color 
in both systems.173 In both SIJS and voluntary placement, courts often 
consider neglect to include lack of food, lack of supervision, or habitation in 
a dangerous neighborhood.174 Poverty is not neglect, however, and family 
advocates in the foster care system seek tirelessly to separate the two.175 
Proposals to clearly separate the two concepts and prevent removal for 
reasons of poverty has even gained congressional attention as the focus of a 
bill proposed by Representative Moore in 2018.176 However, as long as SIJS 
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is the only form of immigration relief available to the families of the youth 
applicants, SIJS applicants and advocates will have no choice but to continue 
to construe neglect broadly. This creates a dynamic in which SIJS advocates 
are forced to argue for a broad definition of neglect and a need for immediate 
permanency determinations—the very arguments that advocates for family 
preservation are fighting to discredit. This tension is an inevitable result of 
the way that SIJS and foster care are designed and implemented, and it stems 
from the same narrative in both systems that blames parents for 
circumstances that are beyond their control. Advocates in both systems 
should push back against these narratives and fight for immigration reform 
and a more adequate social safety net, as achieving these related policy goals 
will benefit families in both systems.177 
The seemingly contrary stances that advocates must take in child welfare 
law and SIJS cases result from the larger, systemic problems that make both 
processes inadequate to truly support these families. Both the immigration 
and child welfare systems are structured in a way that forces parents into 
impossible situations, blames and punishes them for being in those situations, 
and subjects them to supervision based on a fundamental mistrust of their 
fitness to determine the best interests of their own children. As such, SIJS 
and foster care alike fail to fully protect the youth they claim to care about by 
failing to protect their families. These tensions would dissolve if both systems 
implemented policies that truly sought to support, reunify, and protect families. 
IV. SUGGESTIONS FOR CHANGE 
Child welfare law is far from perfect, but policymakers can learn from its 
positive aspects and apply those lessons to improve SIJS and reduce the 
tensions between the two systems. Child welfare law has acknowledged that 
reunification is generally the most preferable permanency outcome.178 While 
the foster care system notoriously struggles to meet that goal, statutory law 
in most states has recognized that helping parents and children reunite should 
 
177 The parallels between family separation in the immigration context and foster care have not 
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that still frames bad parents as harming innocent children. See, e.g., Emily Atkin, The Uncertain Fate of 
Migrant Children Sent to Foster Care, THE NEW REPUBLIC (June 20, 2018), https://newrepublic.com
/article/149161/uncertain-fate-migrant-children-sent-foster-care [https://perma.cc/2QL6-ZHDG] 
(pointing out the inconsistency between Trump’s characterization of May as National Foster Care 
month as recognizing “the plight of innocent children who are in foster care” while at the same time 
disrupting the lives of innocent migrant children separated by his policies). 
178 See Supporting Successful Reunifications, CHILD WELFARE INFO. GATEWAY 1, 1 (Oct. 2017), 
https://www.childwelfare.gov/pubPDFs/supporting_reunification.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y6EM-
QSNN] (“[S]afe and timely family reunification is the preferred permanency option for most 
children.”). 
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be a priority and requires the state to make reasonable efforts to do so.179 
Extending this recognition to SIJS would mean allowing youth to eventually 
sponsor both parents regardless of a previous finding of abuse, abandonment, 
or neglect, if that parent can show a change in circumstances that makes 
reunification in the child’s best interest. 
As the comparatively better outcomes of kinship care show, extended and 
nontraditional families are often the best and most stable option for a child 
that cannot live with his or her parents, and supporting and encouraging these 
arrangements leads to better outcomes.180 Similarly, in 2008, SIJS took 
important steps to recognize a more inclusive vision of family by allowing for 
one-parent cases and removing the foster care requirement.181 However, SIJS 
could do better by providing non-parent sponsors with economic support akin 
to what they would receive as part of the kinship care program, and by 
ensuring the stability of SIJS recipients by granting their custodial guardians 
legal status if they did not already have it. While SIJS could benefit from 
adopting kinship care’s recognition and support of extended families, both 
systems should better respect the privacy and autonomy of those families. 
Economic support for kinship care providers should not be conditioned on 
full licensing as foster parents, and sponsors of SIJS-eligible youth should not 
have to disclose their immigration status directly or indirectly to ORR, family 
court, or any other government body. 
Another needed change to SIJS that would similarly support extended 
and nontraditional families is to allow recipients to sponsor their custodial 
parent concurrent with their own application. Linking sponsorship with a 
recipient’s application better ensures stability in the living situation that the 
state court has designated to be in the child’s best interest. Undocumented 
status may be inappropriately used as a negative factor against parents in 
family court, with judges assuming that an undocumented adult cannot 
provide stability to a child due to their own marginalized status.182 While this 
precariousness is often overstated,183 the current climate has fueled these fears 
and created a toxic stress that is harmful for immigrant families in its own 
right, whether mixed status or not.184 Allowing children to sponsor a guardian 
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for some kind of legal status would provide better stability for the child 
themselves, both economic and emotional. Even if Congress is unwilling to 
grant guardians permanent residency through a family-based petition, 
another potential option could be deferred action similar to Temporary 
Protected Status (TPS), which would allow guardians to receive employment 
authorization and protection from deportation, albeit without a path to 
residency or citizenship.185 
Since such changes are regrettably unlikely to occur in the near future, 
advocates representing clients in SIJS cases will inevitably need to continue 
to make arguments about permanency and neglect that are at odds with the 
goals of families in the foster care system. As such, they should be careful and 
purposeful with their language both before the court and with their clients. 
In conversations with clients, they should recognize and make explicit the 
different cultural standards around neglect that the youth might need to draw 
on, explain why it is necessary to make those arguments, and avoid 
demonizing the parent in conversations with the youth and family 
members.186 Although a court finding that one parent abused, abandoned, or 
neglected a child is necessary for a successful SIJS application, an advocate 
can focus their arguments and evidence on what that parent did rather than 
who they are, which is concededly a small difference, but one that may be 
meaningful to the child on whose behalf it is made. 
Advocates for youth and families in both systems could also benefit from 
recognizing their struggles as interconnected. Family advocates in foster care 
proceedings should continue to distinguish between neglect and poverty, but 
accept that in many SIJS cases, escaping conditions associated with extreme 
poverty is in the best interests of the child and the family. By recognizing that 
these tensions arise from the same false and harmful narratives about their 
clients, advocates can see those tensions not as conflicts, but as another reason 
to combat those false narratives in solidarity. Although it may be expedient 
for SIJS and child advocates alike to utilize the innocent child/bad parent 
framework for a particular case or a policy goal, advocates should instead push 
back on that false dichotomy when it arises and point out the systemic 
injustices that constrain and punish the families they work with. Advocates 
 
185 U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVS., Temporary Protected Status, https://www.uscis.gov/
humanitarian/temporary-protected-status [https://perma.cc/NQD4-YD4Q] (last visited Oct. 30, 2019). 
186 Many lawyers represent both the youth in the SIJS application and the guardian in family 
court, creating additional potential conflicts. See Alexis Anderson, Ethics Issues Inherent in Special 
Immigrant Juvenile State Court Proceedings: Practical Proposals for Intractable Problems, 32 GEO. 
IMMIGR. L.J. 1 (2017) (explaining that differing views about the non-custodial parent and what their 
relationship with the child should be is one potential source of conflict, making it all the more 
important for a lawyer to avoid expressing judgments that could exacerbate that conflict). 
2020] "Best" Interests and "Bad" Parents 547 
may not be able to change the laws of the systems they work within, but they 
can work to change the conversation. 
CONCLUSION 
As the parallels and intersections between the domestic foster care system 
and SIJS show, many of the same false ideas underlie both. Both systems 
frame the benefit they provide as protecting innocent children from bad 
parents as a result of our society’s more general villainization of those parents, 
although the innocent child/bad parent narrative does not fairly reflect the 
reality for most families caught up in these systems. By framing the narrative 
this way, both SIJS and foster care have come to predominate as one of few 
viable alternatives for relief—both socioeconomic and migratory—for these 
families, thereby forcing families in need of socioeconomic or migratory 
support into those processes and that narrative. This ultimately disserves 
both the parents who are vilified by that framework and the youth whose 
voices and autonomy are lost. Despite the concrete benefits that these systems 
can provide, such as medical and behavioral treatment for youth who cannot 
afford it, supporting families in crisis through kinship care networks, and 
providing legal status for otherwise ineligible youth, the bad parent narrative 
undermines these benefits by subjecting families to increased state 
surveillance and control. Extended and nontraditional family caregiving 
networks, instead of being viewed as sources of resilience, are treated with 
mistrust by the government, which seeks to insert itself into the family as a 
precondition to support. Once they are forced into these systems, families 
must make arguments about permanency and neglect that seem to conflict, 
but are actually the result of the limited options and unfair narratives that 
constrain them. A closer look at these seemingly conflicting arguments reveals 
that they developed in response to the limited options for families in need and 
unfair narratives about families in need that inform welfare policy. 
By highlighting the parallels and intersections between foster care and 
SIJS, this Comment seeks to increase awareness of, and in turn challenge, the 
harmful ideas underlying each system. Lawmakers who pay lip service to the 
best interests of innocent children should think critically about the way their 
policies affect the families of those children. The best interests of children are 
best met by supporting and valuing the immediate and extended family 
structures they already have. This means pushing back on the societal 
narratives that view parents in those systems as undesirable and undeserving, 
and which thereby facilitate systems that treat those parents punitively. Only 
by confronting the way our society and institutions view and treat all families 
can we truly ensure the best interests of every child in our country. 
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